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PROSECUTION PROBLEMS
UNDER THE DURHAM RULE
OLIVER GASCH*
S LONG AS JUSTICE has been a treasured concept, man has struggled
with the problem of crime committed by those who are not respon-
sible. In Roman Law it was believed that the insane lacked free will
and were therefore incapable of volitional activity.' The rationality test
2
in the M'Naghten rule3 had its origin in a thirteenth-century legal treatise
by Bracton and thence ultimately its source may be traced to the Greek
philosophers Plato and Aristotle.
For more than a hundred years, the M'Naghten rule, evolved by the
Justices of England at the request of the House of Lords, has been
accepted in this country,4 in England, and in British Commonwealth
nations as the criterion for the guidance of judges and juries in such cases.
One of these M'Naghten areas was the District of Columbia. In this
unique district5 in which the federal. courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over serious common-law crimes, the M'Naghten doctrine was aug-
mented and modified by the "irresistible impulse" doctrine in the Smith
case. 6 However, in 1954, the Durham decision 7 was enunciated. Views
concerning this latter case have differed widely.8 The M'Naghten rule
* A.B. Princeton; LL.B. George Washington University. United States Attorney
for the District of Columbia.
1 DEUTSCH, MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 38 (1937), quoted in 5 CATHOLIC U.L.REv.
64 n.5 (1955).
2 Hall, Responsibility and Law: In Defense of the McNaghten Rules, 42 A.B.A.J.
917 (1956).
3 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
4 But see State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870), wherein the court held that an accused
is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the result of mental disease
or mental defect.
5 Stephens, The State of the Docket and the Need for Additional Judges, 16 D.C.
B.A.J. 57, 60-62 (1949).
6 Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548 (D.C.Cir. 1929).
7 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
8 See, e.g., Hall, Responsibility and Law: In Defense of the McNaghten Rules, 42
A.B.AJ. 917 (1956); Kalven, Insanity and the Criminal Law - A Critique of
Durham v. United States, 22 U.CHI.L.REv. 317 (1955); Sobeloff, Insanity and
the Criminal Law: From McNaghten to Durham and Beyond, 41 A.B.A.J. 793
(1955).
as modified by the "irresistible impulse" test
was therein overthrown as the exclusive
criterion for determining responsibility in
criminal cases:
The rule we now hold must be applied
on the retrial of this case and in future
cases is not unlike that followed by the
New Hampshire Court since 1870. It is
simply that an accused is not criminally
responsible if his unlawful act was the prod-
uct of mental disease or mental defect. 10
What then are the particular problems
of the prosecutor under this formulation
and related cases? They may be divided
roughly into two categories: pre-trial prob-
lems and trial problems.
Throughout this entire discussion it
should be borne in mind that the interest
of the United States Attorney in a criminal
prosecution is not that he shall win. the
case but that justice shall be done. He is
"the servant of the law, the twofold aim
of which is that guilt shall not escape
or innocence suffer. . . .""' As the circuit
Court said in one of our leading cases
involving the defense of insanity: "Our
collective conscience does not allow pun-
ishment where it cannot impose blame.' 12
9 Durham v. United States, supra note 7. "We find
that as an exclusive criterion the right-wrong test
is inadequate in that (a) it does not take sufficient
account of psychic realities and scientific knowl-
edge, and (b) it is based upon one symptom and
so cannot validly be applied in all circumstances.
We find that the 'irresistible impulse' test is also
inadequate in that it gives no recognition to men-
tal illness characterized by brooding and reflection
and so relegates acts caused by such illness to the
application of the inadequate right-wrong test. We
conclude that a broader test should be adopted."
Id. at 874.
10 Id. at 874-75.
11 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
12 Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665,
666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
852 (1947).
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Pre-trial Problems
The "Some Evidence Rule"
The minimal character and quality of the
evidence which invokes this special defense
of insanity is illustrated by two of the lead-
ing cases, Tatum13 and Durham,'4 in the
so-called "some evidence" rule.
Tatum was convicted of carnal knowl-
edge of a 9-year old child. His conviction
was reversed for the reason that "as soon
as 'some evidence of mental disorder is
introduced, . . . sanity, like any other fact,
must be proved as part of the prosecution's
case beyond a reasonable doubt'."'15 In
Durham the court explained what consti-
tutes "some evidence," as follows:
In Tatum we held that requirement satis-
fied by considerably less than is present
here. Tatum claimed lack of memory con-
cerning the critical events and three lay
witnesses testified that he appeared to be
in "more or less of a trance" or "abnormal"
but two psychiatrists testified that he was of
"sound mind" both at the time of examina-
tion and at the time of the crime.16
The mere raising of insanity as a defense
does not dislodge the presumption of sanity.
However, our experience indicates that it
is not difficult for the defense to find "some
evidence" of insanity in cases tried in the
District of Columbia. 7 Further, since there
13 Tatum v. United States, 190 F.2d 612 (D.C.
Cir. 1951).
14 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).
15 Tatum v. United States, supra note 13, at 615.
16 Durham v. United States, sfipra note 14, at 866.
1T Cf. Lebron v. United States, 229 F.2d 16 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 974 (1956). In this
historically interesting case four Puerto Rican ter-
rorists fired indiscriminately from the gallery of
the United States House of Representatives, se-
verely wounding several Congressmen. One of
four court-appointed counsel during the trial told
the court: "it has occurred to us . . . there is
probably something mentally wrong with them.
"[B]ecause of . . . their lack of remorse, their
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is no obligation on the defense to notify
the court or the prosecution of this defense
prior to trial, it may be more difficult
for the prosecution to obtain a mental
examination.
In this connection reference is made to
the most recent case involving Monte
Durham. Following the second reversal
of his conviction for housebreaking and
larceny, this defendant entered a plea of
guilty to petty larceny.18 After serving his
sentence he was indicted for robbery in
June of 1958. As a protective measure the
Government sought a mental examination.
The defense objected. The Government
relied on the history established in the
previous cases. The trial court denied the
Government's -motion, holding that the
Government had failed to show any current
evidence of mental incompetency. 19
peculiar attitude towards this entire situation....
I am firmly convinced there is a strong probability
that these people are mentally unstable." Citing
Wear v. United States, 218 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir.
1954), the court said such a motion for mental
examination will not be granted if not made in
good faith or if frivolous. The motion did not
state the substance of statutory grounds then appli-
cable under 18 U.S.C. §4244. Also it should be
noted the Government had caused the defendants
to be examined by three psychiatrists who found
them sane. Counsel argued that the rule of the
Tatum case, supra note 13, as well as of Wright v.
United States, 215 F.2d 498 (D.C.Cir. 1954),
should be invoked because "some evidence" of in-
sanity had been adduced. The court ruled that
the considerations mentioned were insufficient to
raise the issue of insanity.
18 Durham v. United States, 237 F.2d 760 (D.C.
Cir. 1956). At trial Durham relied on the defense
of insanity. Because of the objection of the defense
to the examination of Durham by a psychiatrist
selected by the Government, psychiatric testimony
was limited to defense psychiatrists. The jury re-
turned a verdict of guilty. The trial court enter-
tained a motion for a finding of not guilty by
reason of insanity, and entered such a judgment
n.o.v.
19 Durham v. United States, Criminal Case No.
719-58 (D.D.C. June 1958).
Though the "some evidence" rule must
be kept in mind throughout a trial, it is
first considered in the pre-trial stage. When-
ever it appears to either the defense or the
prosection that there is "some evidence"
of mental illness which would have a
material relationship to the question of
productivity under the Durham doctrine, 0
then either party should move for mental
observation in a mental hospital. 21
It has been our experience that such a
period of observation in a mental hospital
has a salutary effect in weeding out the
malingerer. Passing reference to Taylor v.
United States'2 demonstrates the point.
Dr. Gilbert, a psychiatrist, on order of the
court had examined Taylor at the district
jail five times. He concluded that Taylor
at the time of the alleged offenses was of
unsound mind, suffering from dementia
praecox, with symptoms that included
confusion, memory failures, hostility, hal-
lucinations and delusions. Taylor was
committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital. After
seven ,months at the Hospital the super-
intendent certified that Taylor was com-
petent to stand trial. Dr. Epstein, a
psychiatrist at the hospital, testified at
the trial that Taylor had told him that
he had not suffered from hallucinations
or delusions but that he had been "going
along with a gag" in describing such epi-
sodes. Dr. Epstein concluded that Taylor
suffered from a sociopathic personality
disturbance with an antisocial reaction and
had a psychopathic personality but was not
psychotic or insane.
The appellate court held that privilege
20 Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19, 25
(D.C.Cir. 1957).
21 See 18 U.S.C. §4244 (1952); D.C.CoDE ANN.
§24-301 (Supp. VI 1958).
22 222 F.2d 398 (D.C.Cir. 1955).
between patient and physician made the
receipt of this testimony error. It should
be noted that Dr. Epstein had raised the
question as to the propriety of his testi-
mony at the trial level. Subsequent to this
reversal, Congress passed a law by reason
of which such testimony is admissible
whenever the defense of insanity is inter-
posed in a criminal case for assault or
homicide, and only when the interests of
justice so demand it.23
Wear v. United States24
This case places a broadened interpre-
tation on section 4244 of Title 18, United
States Code, which relates to the compe-
tency of an accused to stand trial. The
effect of this decision is to require that
motions made for mental examination to
determine competency to stand trial must
be granted unless they are lacking in good
faith or plainly frivolous. The statute uses
the term "reasonable cause." This decision
equates that expression with the concept
of "not frivolous." This situation had to
be corrected by statute. Now the initiation
of proceedings is to depend on "the Court's
own observations or ...prima -facie evi-
dence submitted to the Court. '25
The "Gunther" Hearing
The single issue involved in the appellate
review of Gunther's rape conviction was
whether an accused person who had been
committed as incompetent to stand trial
may be retried without a judicial hearing
to determifie his competency. 2 In this case
there had been filed with the court a cer-
tificate of the superintendent of the hospital
23 D.C. CODE ANN. §24-308 (Supp. VI 1958).
24 218 F.2d 24 (D.C.Cir. 1954).
25 D.C. CODE ANN. §24-301 (Supp. VI 1958).
26 Gunther v. United States, 215 F.2d 493 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).
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wherein the accused was confined to the
effect that he had regained his competency.
The court quoted a colloquy between
Senator Wiley, Chairman of the Subcom-
mittee of the Judiciary Committee of the
Senate, and Judge Magruder as illustrative
of the intention of Congress to require a
judicial determination of competency prior
to trial if there has been a previous judicial
determination of incompetency.2 7 The court
further concluded that the interests of jus-
tice would be served by a remand to the
district court for hearing and determination
of whether appellant was competent to
stand trial when he was tried and sen-
tenced.28 Only if there were a finding of
incompetency would the conviction be
disturbed.
The court distinguished its holding in
Perry v. United States29 which was' re-
versed and remanded for a new trial. In
Perry there had been no previous court
determination of incompetency and hence
no medical certificate was filed attesting
that the accused had recovered his sanity
and was competent to stand trial.
However, failure to hold a Gunther
hearing does not always result in a re-
versal.30 Wells v. United States"1 was an
interesting variation. At sentencing, the
sanity point was raised. Wells was com-
mitted to a mental hospital. Three years
later he was adjudged competent and sen-
tenced. Counsel moved for a new trial
27 Id. at 495.
28 Id. at 497. Justification for a nunc pro tunc
hearing to determine competency is found in the
parallel procedure provided in 18 U.S.C. §4245
(1952).
29 195 F.2d 37 (D.C.Cir. 1952).
30 Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C.
Cir. 1955) (dictum).
81Wells v. United States, 239 F.2d 931 (D.C.
Cir. 1956).
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and the appeal followed the denial thereof.
The appellate court ordered a Gunther
hearing to determine whether Wells was
competent at the time he was tried. If the
determination were in the affirmative then
the sentence would stand. If there were
found to be an inadequate basis for the
determination of competency at the time
of the trial, then a new trial would be
ordered.
Timeliness of Pre-trial Motions Relating
to Mental Examinations
In the Wright32 and Williams3 3 cases
the court in the strongest terms emphasized
the importance of timely mental examina-
tions. Judge Bazelon observed in the Wil-
liams case:
If Williams' violent act in 1949 sprang
from mental disorder - if, indeed, he has a
mental illness which makes it likely that he
will commit other violent acts when his
sentence is served, imprisonment is not a
remedy. Not only would it be wrong to im-
prison him, but imprisonment would not
secure the community against repetitions of
his violence. [84 1 Hospitalization, on the other
hand, would serve the dual purpose of giving
him the treatment required for his illness
and keeping him confined until it would be
safe to release him.t151 Society's great interest
32 Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir.
1957).
33 Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
34 The court's footnote 14: "Under his present
sentence, Williams may be released by September
1958."
35 It seems to the Government that the emphasis
on the protection of society is certainly desirable.
It should be observed, however, that provision is
made for the mental hospitalization of jail or pen-
itentiary inmates who become insane during the
course of their term of imprisonment. See D.C.
CODE ANN. §24-302 (Supp. VI 1958). After trans-
fer of such an individual to a mental hospital
and when the superintendent thereof believes that
such a person is in need of further mental hos-
in the proper disposition of such cases would
be disserved if the Government, in prose-
cuting them, adopted an attitude of passivity
or resistance to the production of evidence....
In the light of the foregoing, we hold that
appellant was denied a speedy trial. We re-
verse the conviction and remand the case
to the District Court for dismissal of the
indictment.tE-16
In Wright,3 7 Judge Bazelon, again speak-
ing for the court and answering the Govern-
ment's attack on the psychiatric evidence,
said: "If the Government feels that psy-
chiatric opinions which come into evidence
ought to be based on examinations of
greater scope and intensity than has been
the practice heretofore, it can and should
arrange to have such examinations made.
'3 s
There can be no doubt as to the impor-
tance of timely mental examinations in
those cases where there is a showing that
"some evidence" of mental illness exists
which relates materially to the causal con-
nection under the Durham rule between
mental illness and the criminal act.
It has been generally assumed that in-
sanity is an affirmative defense. 39 There
pitalization after the termination of the sentence,
administrative provision is made for the filing of
a civil commitment proceeding by the prosecution.
See also 18 U.S.C. §§4247, 4248 (1952).
36 Williams v. United States, supra note 33, at 26.
The court's footnote 15 points out that Williams'
previous confinements to St. Elizabeth's Hospital
were for the sole purpose of restoring sufficient
competency to permit him to be tried.
37 Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4 (D.C.Cir.
1957).
38 ld. at 9.
39 ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, §4.03(1), at 28
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955): "Mental disease or
defect excluding responsibility is an affirmative
defense .. " At page 213 of the transcript of the
proceedings (1955) at which, on the motion of
Judge Parker, this formulation was adopted, Mr.
Wechsler, the Institute Reporter, observed: ". . . I
think that puts a close finger on it as the burden
of the issue that is raised in 4.03(1) and we say -
is much logic behind the proposal in the
American Law Institute Model Penal Code:
Evidence of mental disease or defect ex-
cluding responsibility shall not be admissible
unless the defendant at the time of entering
his plea of not guilty or within ten days
thereafter or at such later time as the court
may for good cause permit files a written
notice of his purpose to rely on such
defense.40
It is submitted that the defense is in a
much better position to ascertain whether
insanity will be interposed as a defense
than the Government. Such a written notice
would permit the Government to file an
appropriate motion for a mental examina-
tion under hospital conditions. This of
course some defendants may not desire.
But if the question is raised in good faith,
full and adequate opportunity for a mental




Nothing is more likely to characterize a
criminal trial than a wide area of conflict
in the testimony both factual and expert.
It is quite understandable that Judge
Bazelon in his Durham opinion should
decide to extend, rather than limit, the
jury inquiry.4 2
and I think all will agree- 'Mental disease or
defect excluding responsibility is an affirmative
defense.' That means the additional burden of
producing evidence is on the defendant. Everyone
would agree to that and that is the law every-
where."
4OALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, §4.03(2) (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955).
41 Cf. Royal Commission on Capital Punishment,
1949-1953, REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932, at 79, 152,
153 (1953), wherein it is stated that the issue of
insanity at the time of the offense can be raised
only by the defense.
42 "[T]he jury's range of inquiry will not be lim-
ited to, but may include, for example, whether an
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Much of the criticism of the M'Naghten
doctrine stems from psychiatrists and aca-
demic lawyers who considered it obsolete
and inadequate. 43 The majority of judges
and practicing lawyers on the other hand
supported the M'Naghten rule on the
ground that it was a good practical test
and that it was not possible to devise a
better one.4
The gist of the criticism is that it relies
on the cognitive phase of mental life. 45
But the knowledge or rationality tests which
Professor Sheldon Glueck criticizes are
defended with equal logic by Professor
Jerome Hall when he questions whether,
in the light of existing knowledge and
accused, who suffered from a mental disease or
defect did not know the difference between right
and wrong, acted upon the compulsion of an irre-
sistible impulse, or had 'been deprived of or lost
the power of his will ... ' Durham v. United
States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
43Royal Commission on Capital Punishment,
1949-1953, REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932, at 106
(1953).
44 Ibid.
45 Id. at 113. The court in Durham quoted Pro-
fessor Sheldon Glueck of Harvard Law School
with approval: "It is evident that the knowledge
tests unscientifically abstract out of the mental
make-up but one phase or element of mental life,
the cognitive, which, in this era of dynamic psy-
chology, is beginning to be regarded as not the
most important factor in conduct and its disorders.
In brief, these tests proceed upon the following
questionable assumptions of an outworn era in
psychiatry: (1) that lack of knowledge of the
'nature or quality' of an act (assuming the mean-
ing of such terms to be clear), or incapacity to
know right from wrong, is the sole or even the
most important symptom of mental disorder; (2)
that such knowledge is the sole instigator and
guide of conduct, or at least the most important
element therein, and consequently should be the
sole criterion of responsibility when insanity is
involved; and (3) that the capacity of knowing
right from wrong can be completely intact and
functioning perfectly even though a defendant is
otherwise demonstrably of disordered mind." Dur-
ham v. United States, supra note 42, at 871.
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experience, lawyers, judges and laymen
should be expected to accept the notion
that a rational person may be insane.46
This leads to what Professor Hall regards
as the critical question: If the normal per-
sonality operates as a unit, as a coalescence
of the various functions, how is it possible
that an essential phase of it, i.e., volition,
can be very seriously diseased while at the
same time intelligence remains normal? 47
Widely divergent views are entertained
as to the ability of the average jury to
weigh the broadened scope of psychiatric
testimony. Dr. Isaac Ray, who played a
major part in the formulation of the New
Hampshire doctrine which is the forerunner
of Durham, felt that juries were manifestly
unfit to solve the question of insanity in a
criminal case.48
Dr. Manfred Guttmacher, an outstand-
ing contemporary forensic psychiatrist,
commented that the New Hampshire for-
mula has a tendency to make the psychia-
trist the arbiter.4 9 While the jury might
disregard the testimony of the psychiatrist
on the issue of whether the criminal act
was the product of the disease, the doctrine
gives psychiatric opinion great weight. The
question is "whether the diagnosis of irre-
sponsibility should be phrased in psychi-
atric terms, and left largely to the expert
testimony of psychiatrists or whether it
should be spelled out in much more general
behavioral terms so that the psychiatrist
46 Hall, Responsibility and Law: In Defense of
the McNaghten Rules, 42 A.B.A.J. 9-17, 919
(1956).
47 Id. at 985, referring to 65 YALE L. J. 761, 775
(1956).
48 Cavanaugh, A Psychiatrist Looks at the Dur-
ham Decision, 5 CATHOLIC U.L. RV. 25, 30
(1955).
49 See ALl, MODEL PENAL CODE, Appendix C,
§4.01, at 188 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
would have much less control in reaching
a decision." 50
It will be recalled that the Royal Com-
mission study concluded that the M'Nagh-
ten rule should be supplemented by adding
an additional test for the guidance of the
jury, namely, that they be required to find
that the defendant had the capacity to pre-
vent himself from committing the crime.5'
As an alternative conclusion it was found
that it would be preferable to abrogate the
rule and to leave to the jury the determina-
tion "whether at the time of the act the
accused was suffering from disease of the
mind (or mental deficiency) to such a
degree that he ought not to be held
responsible."M2
There are many who have taken the
position that the issue is too difficult for
the jury.5 3 However, the Royal Commis-
sion study expresses the contrary view,
and quotes the testimony of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter:
I know the danger and the arguments
against leaving too much discretion, but I
submit with all due respect that at present
the discretion is being exercised but not
candidly. . . . I think probably the safest
thing to do would be to do what they do in
Scotland, because it is what it gets down to
in the end anyhow. 54
50 Ibid. "As a legal test this new definition is
insufficient: it gives undemocratic leeway to the
partisan and/or bureaucratic expert, and, on ac-
count of its wording, lends itself to grave abuse.
It does not guide the jury as to the degree of
mental disease, a term which includes psychosis
and neurosis." Wortham, Psychoauthoritarianism
and the Law, 22 U.CH.L.REv. 336, 337 (1955).
51 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment,
1949-1953, REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932, at 110
(1953).
52 Id. at 116.
53 See note 48 supra.
54 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment,
supra note 51, at 115. For the practice of Scotland
see text accompanying notes 57-59 infra.
The M'Naghten rule is not part of the
laws of Scotland but its principles were
adopted in 1844 and have been broadly
followed55 from that time. Lord Justice Gen-
eral Dunedin, after commenting on the
difficulty of defining insanity, said: "...
and therefore it is left to juries to come
to a common-sense determination on the
matter, assisted by the evidence led and
any direction which the judge can give."5' 0
The law in Scotland on this subject is
adequately summarized:
"The test of insanity now used is com-
plicated and difficult to express. . . . It
might now be stated as whether the accused
had or had not a sane understanding of
the circumstances of his act."5 7
Lord Justice General Cooper' told the
Royal Commission that in his charge to
the jury he would refer to the M'Naghten
rule and "embroider and elaborate" it "to
the effect that the matter for their con-
sideration was whether, on the expert testi-
mony and factual evidence, the accused
had shown the probability to be that he
was not responsible for his actions by
reason of a defect of reason." s
When the jury retired the question they
would put to themselves probably would
be, "Is the man mad or is he not?"5 9
It is in this setting of what the Scotch
Law and practice is that we must consider
the remarks of Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
". .. I think probably the safest thing
to do would be to do what they do in
Scotland, because it is what it gets down
to in the end anyhow." 60
55 Id. at 90.
56 Id. at 91.
57 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
58 Id. at 99.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
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In England, however, the majority of
witnesses were opposed to the suggestion
that the M'Naghten rule be abrogated and
and that the jury be left to decide the issue
of responsibility without the aid of any
legal criterion. 61
The nub of the question is discussed by
the Royal Commission:
In our view the question of responsibility
is not primarily a question of medicine, any
more than it is a question of law. It is essen-
tially a moral question, 62 1 with which the
law is intimately concerned and to whose
solution medicine can bring valuable aid,
and it is one which is most appropriately
decided by a jury of ordinary men and
women, not by medical or legal experts.63
Reference should here be made to the
observation of the Lord Chief Justice that
a jury can always be trusted to do justice.6 4
It should be recognized that the Durham
opinion states plainly: "Juries will continue
to make moral judgments . . .," but the
sentence continues: ". . . still operating
under the fundamental precept that 'Our
collective conscience does not allow pun-
ishment where it cannot impose blame'." 65
In this sentence may be found the ex-
planation of the reversals of jury verdicts
61 Id. at 97.
62 Durham still recognizes that "the legal and
moral traditions of the western world require that
those who, of their own free will and with evil
intent (sometimes called mens rea), commit acts
which violate the law, shall be [held] criminally
responsible for those acts." Durham v. United
States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C.Cir. 1954).
63 "Whatever the state of psychiatry, the psychi-
atrist will be permitted to carry out his principal
court function which, as we noted in Holloway
v. U.S., 'is to inform the jury of the character
of [the accused's] mental disease [or defect]'."
Durham v. United States, supra note 62, at 876.
64 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment,
1949-1953, REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932, at 82 (1953).
65 Durham v. United States, supra note 62, at 876.
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in the Douglas,"0 Wright, 7 and Fielding8
cases. The jury ,made the moral judgment
but the "collective conscience" of the
appellate court did not allow the punish-
ment to be imposed where it could not
impose blame.
The significance of these three reversals
is that the reviewing court was:
, .* unable to say that the juries were
warranted on the evidence in failing to en-
tertain a reasonable doubt that except for
a diseased mental condition Douglas would
have committed the robberies, that is, we
are unable to say that the juries were war-
ranted in reaching an abiding conviction
that the abnormal mental condition defi-
nitely ascertained as early as December was
not a cause without which the September
robberies would not have occurred. Being
of this opinion, after according due defer-
ence to the verdicts of the juries and to the
denials by the trial court of new trials, we
are constrained to conclude that it would
be inconsistent with applicable legal stand-
ards to hold on the records as presently
constituted that punishment for criminal
conduct, rather than treatment for a mental
disease, was the remedy. 69
Here the factual issue was between the
lay testimony on which the Government
relied, namely, that of the victims of the
armed robbery, the bell boy and the night
manager of the hotel, and the police officers
who made the arrest, on one hand, and
psychiatrists on the other. In substance this
lay testimony was to the effect that Douglas
talked normally, was aware of what he was
doing, and gave no indication of any delu-
sions. The lay testimony supporting the
6 Douglas v. United States, 239 F.2d 52 (D.C.
Cir. 1956).
67 Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4 (D.C.Cir.
1957).
68 Fielding v. United States, 251 F.2d 878 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
69 Douglas v. United States, supra note 66, at 59.
defense of insanity came from Douglas'
sister who said that on some days he acted
perfectly normal and on others he did not
and that in her opinion he was suffering
from a mental disease during April and
May, 1952, the period to which most of
her testimony related. The sister also tes-
tified that he had attempted suicide on
three or four occasions, that he suffered
from headaches, pulled his hair, struck his
head against the wall, and threatened her
with physical violence for no apparent rea-
son. There was some corroboration from
the brother and a roomer who testified that
Douglas suffered severe headaches during
which he would moan and say, "By -- ,
they are killing me."
The defense relied also on the testimony
of a psychiatrist, Dr. Gilbert, who examined
Douglas in jail on December 6 and 13,
1952, following two robberies in different
hotels on September 11, 1952. Dr. Gilbert's
diagnosis was dementia praecox. He said
this condition had existed for "several
months" or "at least a few years." He also
concluded that "from the symptoms present
I would think there was a very definite
causal connection."
Another psychiatrist, Dr. Epstein, who
saw Douglas weekly at St. Elizabeth's Hos-
pital to which he was committed from
January 1953, until July 1954, at which
time he was found competent to stand trial,
diagnosed the condition as schizophrenic
reaction paranoid type. This doctor was
unable to testify as to how long Douglas
had been ill or whether he was ill on the
date of the robberies.
The district court charged the jury on
the issue of insanity and the defendant was
found guilty. The appellate court found no
objection to the instructions, but still re-
versed. The court said: "In an appropriate
case there is a duty to set aside a verdict
of guilty and to direct a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity- a duty to
be performed with caution, however, be-
cause of the deference due to the jury in
resolving factual issues."'70
The court found that the earlier Hol-
loway case 71 was not a barrier to its conclu-
sion. There the court had said that a jury
verdict should not be set aside on the
ground that it was contrary to expert psy-
chiatric opinion.72 The distinguishing factor
between the two cases is that expert tes-
timony is to
. . . be considered with the other evi-
dence, not arbitrarily rejected. A jury may
not be upheld in arbitrarily convicting of
crime. We as the reviewing court must be
able to say that the result is rationally con-
sistent with the evidence, measured by the
required degree of proof.73
In Wright v. United States,7 4 the circuit
court sitting en banc reversed a second
degree murder conviction of Clarence L.
Wright. Judge Bazelon in the majority
opinion set forth the rationale of the de-
cision. Whenever some evidence of insanity
is raised by the defense, it becomes the
duty of the Government to prove sanity
at the time of the offense beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. When it appears that reason-
able jurymen could not conclude beyond
a reasonable doubt that the criminal act
was not the product of defendant's mental
disease, there is a duty to set aside the
verdict of guilty and to direct a verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity or to
70 Id. at 57.
71 Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665 (D.C.
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 852 (1947).
72 Id. at 667.
73 Douglas v. United States, 239 F.2d 52, 59 (D.C.
Cir. 1956).
T4 Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4 (D.C.Cir.
1957).
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order a new trial. However, the nature
and quantum of the evidence of sanity
which the Government must produce to
sustain its burden and take the case to
the jury will vary in different cases.7 5
Here, again, the Government had relied
on lay testimony and cross-examination of
psychiatrists. Of the eleven psychiatrists
who testified, only one, Dr. Perretti, gave
the unequivocal answer that the mental
illness caused the criminal act. Three other
psychiatrists expressed their opinions in
degrees of probability. The court said:
"Obviously, unequivocal opinions, if ob-
tainable, are more desirable than equivocal
ones. But the opinion to which a psychia-
trist testifies, need only be 'the type of
clinical opinion he is accustomed to form
and to rely upon in the practice of his
profession'. '7 6 In answer to the Govern-
75 Some six months after Durham and long be-
fore Douglas, in the University of Chicago Sym-
posium on Durham, Edward de Grazia, Esq.,
wrote: "The psychiatric character of Durham's
controlling criterion, 'mental disease or defect,'
pose problems for the jury and the judge. Does
the term embody a jural concept or a psychiatric
one? If jural, then the words are but a practical
synonym for insanity, and unopposed psychiatric
testimony that a defendant suffers from some al-
leged mental disease or defect need not necessarily
compel a judgment of acquittal by reason of in-
sanity .... If, however, it be taken that the court's
use of the term 'mental disease or defect' was
psychiatric rather than jural, then it may be urged
that any mental disorder or behavior pattern
agreed upon by psychiatrists to constitute mental
disease should conclusively generate a finding of
insanity and a judgment of acquittal by reason
thereof. . . . Psychiatrists tend of necessity to
view all aberrant behavior (whether criminal or
neurotic) as mafiifestations of sick minds. As a
result, psychiatric witnesses may be expected gen-
erally to find some 'mental disease' to cover the
case, whatever the defendant's symptomatic crim-
inal behavior may be. . . ." de Grazia, The Dis-
tinction of Being Mad, 22 U.CHI.L.REv. 339, 343
(1955).
76 Wright v. United States, supra note 74, at 8.
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ment's attack on the character and quality
of this psychiatric evidence, it stated: "If
the Government feels that psychiatric opin-
ions which come into evidence ought to be
based on examinations of greater scope
and intensity than has been the practice
heretofore, it can and should arrange to
have such examinations made."7 7 But the
prosecution cannot always arrange an early
psychiatric examination.7"
In the Wright case the dissent *was
written by Judge Wilbur Miller, with two
other judges concurring. After setting forth
the facts of the murder, he emphasized the
admissibility of the lay testimony and the
acceptance of it by the jury; he also pointed
out the many conflicts between the tes-
timony of the psychiatrists which furnished
a basis for the rejection of this testimony
by the jury.
As weak as the evidence of insanity was,
there was unquestionably a conflict of testi-
mony on the single crucial question whether
Wright was mentally responsible on the
morning of the crime. The evidence there-
fore presented a typical jury question which
conceivably could have been decided either
way. The decision was for the jury, how-
ever, and not for us; we have no right
whatever to substitute our judgment for
that of the jury when there is evidence to
support its verdict, no matter what evidence
there may have been to the contrary and
no matter how much we may wish to decide
the question the other way. Cf. Bradley v.
United States, 102 U.S. App. D.C. 17, 249
F. 2d 922, [decided September 20, 1957].
The reversal of Wright's conviction is, I
think, arbitrary and unjustifiable. 79
T7 Id. at 9.
78 United States v. Durham, Criminal Case No.
719-58 (D.C.D.C. June, 1958), Durham's most
recent charge in which the trial court refused the
Government's application for mental examination
in the face of the objections of Durham's counsel.
79 Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4, 16 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
In Bradley v. United States,80 the jury's
verdict was affirmed with Judge Bazelon
dissenting. The majority reviewed the
"equivocal" testimony of the psychiatrist
and recounted the lay testimony including
that of the victim which indicated meth-
odical planning on the part of the defen-
dant. The arresting officers had noted no
abnormal behavior on the part of Bradley
who had been steadily employed as a
roofer and electrical worker.
The dissent emphasized that the psy-
chiatrist, Dr. de Filippis, is an expert whose
qualifications were not impugned by the
Government. As to whether the robbery
was the product of Bradley's mental con-
dition, the doctor said in his opinion it was
although he could not say so with any
degree of certainty. He felt the disease
(dementia praecox, paranoid type) had
existed for two or three years, a period
which included the robbery.
The dissent took the position that the
Government had failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the sanity of the defen-
dant at the time of the criminal act and
that reliance upon the lay testimony of the
victim and the two policemen was im-
proper. "Capacity to plan does not prove
that the planner is not suffering from an
advanced condition of dementia praecox.
A criminal act 'may be coolly and care-
fully prepared; yet . . . still the act of a
madman'."
8 1
80249 F.2d 922 (D.C.Cir. 1957).
81 Id. at 928. The reference in the language quoted
is to the Royal Commission Report, dealing with
the objections to the irresistible impulse doctrine,
namely, that the designation carries the implica-
tion of impulsive conduct. The text of the thought
to which reference was made reads as follows:
"The criminal act, in such circumstances, may be
the reverse of impulsive. It may be coolly and
carefully prepared; yet it is still the act of a
madman. This is merely an illustration; similar
The case of Jimmy Fielding82 follows
the familiar pattern of the Douglas and
Wright cases. The jury believed the lay
testimony and was not persuaded by the
psychiatric testimony. Fielding was con-
victed of the second degree murder of his
wife's uncle. His defense was insanity. Fol-
lowing the shooting on February 5, 1954,
he was arrested and jailed. Dr. de Filippis
examined him in the jail and diagnosed his
condition as dementia praecox. Following
a hearing, he was committed. Twenty-nine
months later he was certified competent to
stand trial and after a Gunther hearing83
was tried and found guilty. The defense
moved for a judgment of acquittal by
reason of insanity notwithstanding the
verdict. From the denial of the motion
the appeal followed.
Judge Bazelon's opinion for the majority
was to the effect that the motion for judg-
ment n.o.v. should have been granted be-
cause the Government had failed to sustain
its burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the shooting was not the product
of appellant's mental illness. Two psychia-
trists who examined Fielding at the hos-
pital on a number of occasions expressed
the opinion that he was suffering from
schizophrenia at the time of the shooting
and that the shooting was the product of
the illness.
The Government relied on lay testimony,
namely, the police officers and the appel-
lant's wife and his brother. The court held
states of mind are likely to be behind the criminal
act when murders are committed by persons suf-
fering from schizophrenia or paranoid psychoses
due to disease of the brain." Royal Commission
on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, REPORT, Cmd.
No. 8932, at 110 (1953).
82 Fielding v. United States, 251 F.2d 878 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
83 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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that this testimony taken together was not
"sufficiently probative in the face of the
strong showing of insanity made by the
defense to permit reasonable jurymen to
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
appellant was sane at the time of the
shooting."
in dissenting, Judge Danaher empha-
sized that the majority had substituted its
judgment for that of the trier of facts who
saw .and heard the witnesses, and 'was in
the best position to appraise the evidence
and the weight to be accorded to it. This
judge further expressed the view that the
jury was not bound to credit the opinions
of psychiatrists but rather it is free to
accept or reject their testimony just as it
may do as to the testimony of any other
witness.
The Psychiatrist as a Witness
There has been noted many times the
dissatisfaction of psychiatrists with the
M'Naghten rule. They say it has failed to
keep pace with the progress made in their
profession; it places an undue restriction
on their testimony; it requires them to
express opinions in the field of moral
responsibility for which they are not trained
and lack competence.
While recognizing that the Durham rule
has a tendency to make the psychiatrist the
arbiter 84 rather than the jury, some psy-
chiatrists nevertheless do see advantages
in the new rule.85
84 See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
85 Comment, 5 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 74 (1955).
"Psychiatrists, in giving expert testimony as to the
mental condition of the defendant at the time of
the criminal act, need no longer play the role of
a pseudo-doctor or pseudo-lawyer. Since he is no
longer confined within the narrow limits of the
antiquated tests, the psychiatrist is now free to
present to the jury his complete analysis of the
defendant's mental condition." But see The After-
math of the Durham Rule, address delivered by
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To appreciate the importance of psy-
chiatric testimony, one must look to the
Carter case,80 wherein the Durham rule is
restated. The court said:
Generally speaking, in order to return a
verdict of guilty notwithstanding the de-
fense of insanity, the jury must find (1)
that beyond reasonable doubt the accused
is free of mental disease; or, if the finding
is "No, he may have a mental disease,"
then (2) that beyond reasonable doubt no
relationship existed between the disease and
the alleged criminal act which would justify
a conclusion that but for the disease the act
would not have been committed.87
Proving the absence of a "critical" rela-
John R. Cavanagh to the Jacobi Medical Society,
Feb. 17, 1958: "The new rule, the Durham De-
cision, was widely acclaimed as being an advance
both from the legal and psychiatric points of
view. Psychiatrically, one of its greatest values
was supposed to be that it would allow the psy-
chiatrist to 'present his testimony about the mental
condition of the accused in concepts that are
familiar to him and medically realistic.' This is
probably true except that there never was a time
when he could not do so. True, when he had.
presented his facts he was asked under the old
rule the M'Naghten questions.
"Under the new rule, however, he may be
asked not only these M'Naghten questions but
also the frequently impossible to answer Durham
question. To this day, four years and thirty-five
cases later there is no satisfactory definition of
the terms in this decision. Even when the judges
of the lower courts have quoted verbatim from
the sample instruction given in the Durham De-
cision, they have been unable to give one satis-
factory to the Appellate Court. As for leaving
the psychiatrists free to 'talk, unfettered by arbi-
trary legal formulae,' I am sure that many of
you will agree that 'unfettered' psychiatric testi-
mony in the physician's own terms is not likely
to add to the clarity of his statement to the jury
[or the judge in many cases]. This frequently
leaves the jury without any guides to aid them in
their decision. It is on the contrary likely to leave
them floundering in a morass of psychiatric ter-
minology." Ibid.
86 Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
87 1d. at 618.
tionship between the mental illness and
the criminal act is an extremely difficult
undertaking. Still it must be done in every
case where there is "some evidence" of
insanity.88 It obviously is the type of proof
that can be furnished only by expert tes-
timony. This makes the psychiatrist the
arbiter" if he is to testify on this point
at all.90
What may result is a battle of the experts
in which the psychiatrists might inadver-
tently be put in the position to pre-empt
the entire area.9 1 Actually, the battle of
experts would have very little meaning for
a jury, particularly if it were in an already
controversially confused field such as
psychopathy. 2
88 See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862
(D.C.Cir. 1954); Tatum v. United States, 190
F.2d 612 (D.C.Cir. 1951).
80 See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
90 See note 85 supra.
01 See ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE §4.01, (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955), in which there is contained
a series of letters between Dr. Guttmacher and
Professor Wechsler. Dr. Guttmacher, in speaking
of the "product" formula, wrote:
"It seems to me that you have very strong resist-
ance against this and philosophically you may be
entirely justified in feeling so. It is hard for me to
be completely objective about this, perhaps it is
for you. I think this really comes down to the
meat of the matter; whether the diagnosis of irre-
sponsibility should be phrased in psychiatric terms
and left largely to the expert testimony of psychia-
trists, or whether it should be spelled out in much
more general behavioral terms, so that the psy-
chiatrist would have much less control in reaching
a decision.
"I do not feel that we psychiatrists want to pre-
empt this whole area but we do resent having to
focus on concepts in which, unfortunately, we
have no very special claim to knowledge. Your
formula [ALI rule] is certainly far better than
the McNaghten formula, but it still forces psy-
chiatrists not to think in terms of mental disease
but in terms of general social behavior, without
reference to the conceptual system with which he
is familiar." Id. at 188.
02 Id. at 191. Professor Wechsler to Dr. Gutt-
macher:
Some appreciation of the reluctance of
the psychiatrist to be a witness and of his
antipathy to traditional courtroom proce-
dures may be gained from the observations
of one of the most experienced forensic
psychiatrists. Dr. Guttmacher wrote:
Instead of having his views received with
the deference and respect to which he is
accustomed, he is likely to be disconcerted
-if this is his first experience- on cross-
examination to hear his professional com-
petence and even his intelligence impugned
and his pronouncements ridiculed, mis-
stated, and twisted into absurdities (or per-
haps exposed as being absurdities by a
lawyer displaying a surprising familiarity
with the scientific learning and literature
on the subject). Is there any wonder that
the medical expert often dislikes and even
resents the role he is forced to play?
To be sure, most of the objections of the
psychiatric expert to court procedures are
common to all medical testimony and even
to expert testimony in general. However,
psychiatry, because of its complex nature
is less capable than any other medical spe-
cialty of having its conclusions reduced to
.yes or no answers or to have them brought
out satisfactorily through questioning by
non-medically trained attorneys.93
The Royal Commission has considered
the question of the divergent views of the
various schools of psychiatry, the absence
of universally accepted terminology, and
the marked difference of views often en-
countered in the same case. It was noted
that these differences among psychiatrists
persist even in the field of law and ethics
"What could be a less constructive way to liti-
gate the issue of a psychopath's responsibility than
to have you testify that psychopathy is not a dis-
ease and someone like Karpman or CIeckley testify
that it is. Would a controversy pitched in these
terms be likely to educe a meaningful judgment
from the court or jury on the issue of respon-
sibility?" Ibid.
98 Id. at 180.
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and particularly the issue of criminal re-
sponsibility and the extent to which mental
abnormality would serve to absolve the
offender from the criminal consequences of
his act.9 4 The Royal Commission expressed
the opinion that these difficulties would be
very grave, perhaps insuperable, if respon-
sibility were a medical question. 95
It emphasized the importance of estab-
lishing understandable criteria for the guid-
ance of the jury in view of the fact that
some medical evidence is obscure and may
be imperfectly understood by the jury.96
In the Carter opinion 97 the court also
set forth the chief functions of the expert
witness, as follows:
The chief value of an expert's testimony
in this field, as in all other fields, rests
upon the material from which his opinion
is fashioned and the reasoning by which he
progresses from his material to his conclu-
sion; in the explanation of the disease and
its dynamics, that is, how it occurred, de-
veloped, and affected the mental and emo-
tional processes of the defendant; it does
not lie in his mere expression of conclu-
sion. t98 3 The ultimate inferences vel non of
94 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment
1949-1953, REPORT Cmd. No. 8932, at 100
(1953).
95 Id. at 108. "[Even if it were on other grounds
desirable to do so, it would, in the present state
of medical knowledge, be out of the question to
remove the issue of criminal responsibility from
the courts and entrust its determination to a panel
of medical experts, as has sometimes been sug-
gested." Ibid.
96 Id. at 108.
97 Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
98 Psychiatrists may not be able to produce evi-
dence on the basis of which they render a conclu-
sion. In commenting on the Durham decision, Dr.
Gregory Zilboorg wrote: "[T]he trial judge in the
Monte W. Durham case tried to pin Dr. Gilbert
down on the issue of whether Durham's transgres-
sions were a result of his mental illness. The an-
swer to such a question in this case should have
been a bold and unequivocal 'Yes' - provided the
court would not demand the impossible from the
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relationship, of cause and effect, are for the
trier of the facts.99
It will be noted that the trend to place
greater reliance on expert psychiatric testi-
mony is illustrated by the contrast between
the Holloway'00 case and the Douglas'01
case. In Holloway, the court cautioned
that the jury verdict would not be set aside
even if it were contrary to expert opinion
unless it shocked the conscience of the
court. In Douglas, the jury verdict was set
aside for the reason that the jury arbitrarily
rejected "expert testimony."
The limitations on psychiatric testimony
imposed by privilege have even been
removed by statute. In Taylor v. United
States,102 privilege was construed to extend
to admissions of feigning insanity by a
patient accused of crime to a psychiatrist
in a Government hospital to which the
accused was committed. Subsequently,
Congress has made it clear that where the
defense is insanity no limitations flowing
from privilege shall prevent the psychiatrist
from testifying to admissions of the patient
pertaining to the alleged illness.
10 3
In the Fielding case,10 4 psychiatric tes-
timony generally was the subject of a
critique:
Since Douglas we have had occasion to
observe that there may be "deficiencies in
psychiatrist and insist that he produce 'evidence'
of how this particular act was the result of this
particular illness." Kalven, Insanity and the Crim-
inal Law - A Critique of Durham v. United States,
22 U. CHI. L. REv. 317, 335 (1955).
99 Carter v. United States, supra note 97, at 617.
100 Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665 (D.C.
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 852 (1947).
101 Douglas v. United States, 239 F.2d 52 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
102 222 F.2d 398 (D.C.Cir. 1955).
103 D.C. CODE ANN. §14-308 (Supp. V 1958).
But see text accompanying note 23 supra.
104 Fielding v. United States, 251 F.2d 878, 881
(D.C.Cir, 1957).
the process by which we collect the evi-
dence upon which cases like this turn"; 10 51
that the psychiatric examinations upon
which the expert witnesses' testimony is
based may be "inadequate in that they do not
gather enough information to pin-point the
origin of [the] illness";t10 61 that "the facts
required by way of psychiatric testimony
are a 'description and explanation of the
origin, development and manifestations of
the alleged disease . . . how it occurred,
developed, and affected the mental and
emotional processes of the defendant * * *,"'
and that "the examinations conducted by
the psychiatrists must be of a character
they deem sufficient for the purpose of
determining the facts requiredt 1 07 1 . . .,,108
Lay Testimony
Lay testimony, particularly the type on
which the Government relies, has been
downgraded by the circuit court in the
recent decisions since Durham.
Lay witnesses may testify upon observed
symptoms of mental disease, because men-
tal illness is characterized by departures
from normal conduct. Normal conduct and
abnormal conduct are matters of common
knowledge, and so lay persons may con-
clude from observation that certain ob-
served conduct is abnormal. Such witnesses
may testify only upon the basis of facts
known to them. They may testify as to
their own observations and may then ex-
press an opinion based upon those obser-
vations. Of course the testimony of a lay
witness with training in this or related fields
may have more value than the testimony of
a witness with no such training. Also obvious
upon a moment's reflection is the fact that,
while a lay witness's observation of ab-
normal acts by an accused may be of great
105 Wright v. United States, 215 F.2d 498 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).
106 Blunt v. United States, 244 F.2d 355 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
107 Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
108 Fielding v. United States, supra note 104, at
881.
value as evidence, a statement that a wit-
ness never observed an abnormal act on
the part of the accused is of value if, but
only if, the witness had prolonged and in-
timate contact with the accused.'0 9
This language is especially helpful to one
seeking to establish the defense of insanity.
Obviously, those having "prolonged and
intimate contact" with him are his family
and friends. Those who were in contact
with the accused at the time of the crime
and thereafter are practically ignored in
spite of the fact that the act itself is a vital
part of the Durham formula.
It is in a sense, comparable to the situa-
tion wherein a ball game was decided by
a home run in the ninth inning. Two spec-
tators are being interviewed. One saw the
entire game except the decisive home run.
During that point of time he had gone to
the hot-dog stand. The other spectator
came in just as the player who hit the
home run came to bat. He saw the homer
and the game was over. My point is that
he who witnessed the critical play of the
game 10 should not as a witness be ruled
less important than one who had seen the
game except for the home run which de-
cided the ball game.
Other cases are even more pointed in
downgrading any lay testimony which in-
109 Carter v. United States, supra note 107, at 618.
(Emphasis added.) But see Queenan v. Oklahoma,
190 U.S. 548 (1903); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v Lathrop, I1l U.S. 612 (1884).
110 See Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C.
Cir. 1957). The court seems to recognize this
point: "The basic concern of the law at that point
is whether the accused was in such mental con-
dition that he should be held responsible for his
crime. The inquiry, and the decision, must be as
of the time of the offense. Evidence as to the
accused's mental condition either before or after
the offense may be admissible, but it is admissible
only in so far as it is relevant to his condition as
of the time of the offense." Id. at 729.
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dicates absence of abnormal conduct and
which usually comes from witnesses to the
criminal act or those who saw the accused
about the time of the act. In Fielding, the
Government offered no psychiatric testi-
mony. It did offer the testimony of Field-
ing's wife and brother as well as the police
officers. These witnesses testified that the
accused was normal or was "not unsound."
The court said:
All of the lay testimony offered by the
Government taken together was not suffi-
ciently probative, in the face of the strong
showing of insanity made by the defense,
to permit reasonable jurymen to conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant
was sane at the time of the shooting. What
we have said elsewhere about an opinion
of sanity expressed by an untrained lay
witness having no prolonged and intimate
contact with the accused disposes of the
testimony of the policemen in this case.
The conclusions of normalcy and sound-
ness of mind expressed by appellant's
brother and wife, stand not much higher
than those of the policemen. Both were out
of touch with appellant for a considerable
time until just before the shooting and
neither professed to have any training or
experience in the judgment of sanity. More-
over, their actual observations, upon which
their opinions must rest, were hardly con-
sistent with conclusions of normalcy or
soundness of mind. .... I"
It is interesting to note that in reversing
the Fielding conviction the appellate court
gave the Government the opportunity of
retrying the case: "If the Government feels
that it can produce [psychiatric] evidence
on the issue of appellant's sanity at the
time of the shooting which it could not
produce or thought it unnecessary to pro-
duce at the last trial .. 112
111 Fielding v. United States, 251 F.2d 878, 880
(D.C.Cir. 1957).
112 Id. at 881.
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A few days after the opinion was re-
leased an order of the court struck the
word psychiatric. Thus we may conclude
that though psychiatric testimony is not
specifically necessary, it is very desirable
to have it if possible. Under the circum-
stances the case could not be retried and
Fielding is at present confined in a mental
hospital.
In Douglas v. United States,11s lay tes-
timony of the victims of the two robberies
and the police officers who interrogated
defendant after his apprehension was held
insufficient to sustain the Government's
burden of excluding the hypothesis of
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. In
Wright v. United States,114 the court quoted
from the Carter case"1 5 on the lay witness
point and arrived at the same conclusion.
In Blunt"1 6 the lay testimony was more
extensive. It included the detailed statement
of a New Jersey police officer who had
Blunt in custody and after interviewing
him extensively brought him before a
magistrate for arraignment. Lay testimony
in Bradley'1 7 was relied on by the Gov-
ernment, when the majority saw evidence
of planning, and the conviction was sus-
tained. Though the Kelley case'1 8 did not
turn on the lay testimony point, it does
contain a ruling that the jury could have
decided the sanity of the accused based on
the extensive testimony of an auto sales-
man who spent almost a day with Kelley
filling out blanks and talking generally,
113 239 F.2d 52 (D.C.Cir. 1958).
114 215 F.2d 498 (D.C.Cir. 1954).
115 Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
116Blunt v. United States, 244 F.2d 355 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
117 Bradley v. United States, 249 F.2d 922 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
11SKelley v. United States, 236 F.2d 746 (D.C.
Cir. 1956).
although two psychiatrists thought he was
of unsound mind.
Burden of Proof
In the federal courts following Davis v.
United States,11 9 decided in 1895, the
burden has been upon the Government,
whenever the defense of insanity is raised
properly by evidence, to prove sanity be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Of course, both
this case and Guiteau's Case1 20 applied this
burden on the basis of the M'Naghten rule
which casts a less onerous burden on the
Government. To prove sanity beyond a
reasonable doubt, or to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that there is no direct
critical, causal connection between the
criminal act and the mental illness of which
only "some evidence" need be shown is a
horse of another color. In our experience
psychiatrists generally are unwilling or
unable to give testimony on the absence
of causality, particularly to the extent re-
quired by the Government.
Burden of proof in cases involving the
defense of insanity is about equally divided
in state jurisdictions. Twenty-one states and
the federal courts require the Government
to prove responsibility beyond a reasonable
doubt. A defendant pleading this defense
is required to prove irresponsibility by a
preponderance of the evidence in another
twenty-one states. 121 Oregon requires a
defendant interposing insanity as a defense
to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. 122
The English position is that every man is
presumed sane and responsible until the
119 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
120 10 Fed. 161 (1882).
121 ALI MODEL PENAL CODE, Appendix C, §4.03,
at 193 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
122 The Oregon statute was sustained as constitu-
tional in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
It is within the orbit of a state's power to try
violations of its criminal laws.
contrary is shown to the jury's satisfaction.
The defense of insanity must be clearly
proved. 123
Taylor Case Instructions
Taylor v. United States124 was reversed
for several reasons not pertinent at this
point of our discussion. However, the sixth
point discussed sets forth the instruction
language of the trial judge's instruction to
the jury on the consequences of a verdict
of not guilty by reason of insanity. The
same point has been raised in several sub-
sequent cases, 123 and some were reversed
because of the failure of the trial court to
give the Taylor instruction. The instruction
is:
But we think when an accused person
has pleaded insanity, counsel may and the
judge should inform the jury that if he is
acquitted by reason of insanity he will be
presumed to be insane and may be confined
in a "hospital for the insane" as long as
"the public safety and . . . [his] welfare"
require. 126
In the second Durham case 127 the appel-
late court, speaking through Judge Baze-
Ion, held that it was error for the trial
court to tell the jury that if they found the
123 ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 121, at
194.
124 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
125 Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C.
Cir. 1958); Catlin v. United States, 251 F.2d 368
(D.C.Cir. 1957); Bradley v. United States, 249
F.2d 922 (D.C.Cir. 1957); Tatum v. United States,
249 F.2d 129 (D.C.Cir. 1957); Blunt v. United
States, 244 F.2d 355 (D.C.Cir. 1957); Durham v.
United States, 237 F.2d 760 (D.C.Cir. 1956);
Kelley v. United States, 221 F.2d 822 (D.C.Cir.
1956).
126 Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 404
(D.C. Cir. 1955). The court then commented
that while this fact has no theoretical bearing on
the jury's verdict, it may have a practical bearing.
Ibid.
127 Durham v. United States, supra note 125.
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accused not guilty by reason of insanity,
it would be his duty to commit him to
St. Elizabeth's where he would remain until
determined to be of sound mind by the
hospital authorities; and that if the authori-
ties adhere to their last opinion on this
point he will be released very shortly.
This latter comment was labelled "plain
error. '128 It was pointed out that by statute
the jury should not be told that the accused
has been found competent to stand trial. 129
There is a difference, the court said, be-
tween competency to stand trial and such
soundness of mind that would warrant
discharge from a hospital. The superin-
tendent's letter illustrates the point. He
said Durham suffers from a psychological
illness but is competent to stand trial and
is able to consult with counsel and assist
in his own defense.
Among other points considered in Lyles
v. United States130 were the Taylor case
instructions. The court was sharply di- -
vided. 131 The majority opinion established
the circumstances in which the Taylor
instructions mandatorily must be given.
Unless the defense requests to the contrary,
the trial judge, ". . .whenever, hereafter
the defense of insanity is fairly raised ...
shall instruct the jury as to the legal mean-
ing of a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity in accordance with the view ex-
pressed in this opinion.' 13 2
128 Id. at 761.
129 18 U.S.C. §4244 (1952).
130 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
131 Id. at 727.
132 Id. at 729. (Emphasis added.) The new Taylor
instructions are as follows: "[T]he jury should
simply be informed that a verdict of not guilty
by reason of insanity means that the accused will
be confined in a hospital for the mentally ill until
the superintendent has certified, and the court is
satisfied, that such person has recovered his sanity
PROSECUTION PROBLEMS
It was pointed out that ordinarily the
jury has no concern with the consequences
of a verdict but since a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity has no com-
monly understood meaning, the court
thought the jury has a right to know the
significance of such a verdict.
Judge Bazelon, who concurred with this,
dissented in Bradley v. United States.133
He took the position that the trial court's
Taylor instruction was error in that it men-
tioned only that if Bradley were found not
guilty by reason of insanity he would be
committed to a hospital where he would
remain until it was judicially determined
that he is of sound mind, at which time he
will be released. It was pointed out that
the omission of the language that Bradley
must also show that he would not be dan-
gerous to himself or others in order to
obtain a release from a mental hospital if
committed. The majority observed that the
Taylor instructions were mandatory only
prospectively after the Lyles case.
After Tatum's second conviction, his
appeal centered around the trial court's
refusal to give the Taylor instructions.134
The Government had brought the matter
to the trial court's attention;, the defense
did not request that the instruction be
given. In that state of the record, Judge
Burger, speaking for the majority, was con-
strained to observe that:
The complaining witness was 9 years old
and will not in the reasonable future be dangerous
to himself or to others, in which event and at which
time the court shall order his release either uncon-
ditionally or under such conditions as the court
may see fit." Id. at 728. This instruction follows
the language of the 1955 statute. See D.C.CoDE
ANN. §24-301 (Supp. VI 1958).
133 249 F.2d 922 (D.C.Cir. 1957).
134 Tatum v. United States, 249 F.2d 129 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
when the offense occurred in 1949. One
purpose of Rule 30 was to preclude a de-
fendant from exploiting his own failure to
make timely objections. In this case there
is not even a basis for suggesting the failure
was an oversight of counsel.
To encourage, or even tolerate this one-
sided "Russian Roulette" with the courts
could lead to a breakdown of all law en-
forcement in a system already plagued by
multiple trials. Tatum's next plea, if we
gave him one, could well be that he has
been denied a speedy trial. 13 5
Jury Instructions Generally
When the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit formulated the
Durham doctrine, it emphasized that when-
ever there is "some evidence" that the
accused suffered from a mental disease or
defect the trial court must provide the jury
with guides for determining whether the
accused can be held criminally responsible.
After commenting that the appellate court
could not formulate an instruction appro-
priate or binding for every case, Judge
Bazelon set forth the sense and substance
of what must be given to the jury under
the new rule.136
135 Id. at 132.
136 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1954). The suggested instruction appears as
follows: "If you the jury believe beyond a reason-
able doubt that the accused was not suffering from
a diseased or defective mental condition at the
time he committed the criminal act charged, you
may find him guilty. If you believe he was suffer-
ing from a diseased or defective mental condition
when he committed the act, but believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that the act was not the product
of such mental abnormality, you may find him
guilty. Unless you believe beyond a reasonable
doubt either that he was not suffering from a dis-
eased or defective mental condition, or that the act
was not the product of such abnormality, you must
find the accused not guilty by reason of insanity.
Thus your task would not be completed upon find-
ing, if you did find, that the accused suffered from
a mental disease or defect. He would still be
In explanation of the new instructions.
reference was made in a court footnote to
the Royal Commission Report. This para-
graph in its entirety suggests a causal con-
nection between mental abnormality and
crime but emphasizes that it is a legal, not
a medical question. Emphasis is also laid
on the facts of the crime.137
Before setting forth the suggested in-
structions the Court wrote two interesting
sentences about the older tests:
responsible for his unlawful act if there is no
causal connection between such mental abnor-
mality and the act. These questions must be deter-
mined by you from the facts which you find to be
fairly deducible from the testimony and the evi-
dence in this case." Id. at 875.
137 Id. at 875 n. 49. Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment, 1949-1953 REPORT, Cmd. No. 8932,
at 99 (1953):
"It has often been said that the question of
criminal responsibility, although it is closely bound
up with medical and ethical issues, is primarily a
legal question. There is an important sense in
which this is true. There is no a priori reason why
every person suffering from any form of mental
abnormality or disease, or from any particular
kind of mental disease, should be treated by the
law as not answerable for any criminal ojpense
which he may commit, and be exempted from
conviction and punishment. Mental abnormalities
vary infinitely in their nature and intensity and in
their effects on the character and conduct of those
who suffer from them. Where a person suffering
from a mental abnormality commits a crime,
there must always be some likelihood that the
abnormality has played some part in the causa-
tion of the crime; and, generally speaking, the
graver the abnormality and the more serious the
crime, the more probable it must be that there is
a causal connection between them. But the close-
ness of this connection will be shown by the facts
brought in evidence in individual cases and cannot
be decided on the basis of any general medical
principle. On the other hand, few persons, if any,
would go so far as to suggest that anyone suffering
from any mental abnormality, however slight,
ought' on that ground to be wholly exempted from
responsibility under the criminal law. It therefore
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We find that as an exclusive criterion the
right-wrong test is inadequate in that (a) it
does not take sufficient account of psychic
realities and scientific knowledge, and (b)
it is based upon one symptom and so cannot
validly be applied in all circumstances. We
find that the "irresistible impulse" test is
also inadequate in that it gives no recog-
nition to mental illness characterized by
brooding and reflection and so relegates
acts caused by such illness to the application
of the inadequate right-wrong [M'Naghten]
test."138
In reaching this conclusion the court
quoted Dr. Isaac Ray, Professor Sheldon
Glueck, Justice Cardozo, The GAP Report
and many other psychiatric and legal writ-
ings. The denunciation of the older tests
seemed so unequivocal and complete that
the Government concluded that in so far
as its jurisdiction is concerned, M'Naghlen
and irresistible impulse had for all practical
purposes joined the dodo bird.' 39
becomes necessary for the law to provide a method
of determining what kind and degree of mental
abnormality shall entitle offenders to be so ex-
empted; and also to decide what account shall be
taken of lesser degrees of mental abnormality,
whether by way of mitigation of sentence or
otherwise." Id. at 99. (Underlined text was omit-
ted from the court's quotation.)
138 Durham v. United States, supra note 136, at
874.
139 Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., in his introduc-
tory article to the University of Chicago Law
Review Symposium on Durham, wrote that the
decision "directly and unequivocally repudiated
the classic MNaghten test for insanity as a de-
fense in a criminal case." Kalven, Insanity and
the Criminal Law - A Critique of Durham v.
United States, 22 U. CHi. L. REv. 317 (1955).
Dr. Philip Q. Roche, in the same Symposium
concluded: "the Durham opinion abandons the
right-and-wrong rule and likewise rejects the
'irresistible impulse' test." Roche, Criminality and
Mental Illness- Two Faces of the Same Coin,
22 U. Cm. L. REv. 320 (1955).
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Then came Douglas v. United States.140
But in Durham we concluded that the
advance of psychiatric knowledge dem-
onstrated the fallacy of making these
particular " 'symptoms, phases or mani-
festations'" the exclusive criteria to guide
the jury. In so holding, however, we did
not purport to bar all use of the older tests:
testimony given in their terms may still be
received if the expert witness feels able to
give it, and where a proper evidential foun-
dation is laid a trial court should permit
the jury to consider such criteria in re-
solving the ultimate issue "whether the
accused acted because of a mental dis-
order". In aid of such a determination the
court may permit the jury to consider
whether or not the accused understood the
nature of what he was doing and whether
or not his actions were due to a failure,
because of mental disease or defect, prop-
erly to control his conduct.141
About a year ago, in the Carter 42 and
Wright143  cases, the trial judges were
given supplemental data on what must be
contained in instructions to the jury on
the ultimate issue, that is, causation or
productivity.
The trial court's instructions in Carter
were made the subject of criticism. After
quoting the language of the objectionable
instruction, 144 the court said that ". . . the
purport of the instruction, and the clear
impression left by it, was that, in order to
acquit, the jury must reach affirmative con-
140 239 F:2d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
141 Id. at 58.
142 Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 614
(D.C.Cir. 1957).
14 Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4 (D.C.Cir.
1957).
144 "In order for you to acquit on the ground of
insanity, you must find both of these elements
present. It is not sufficient for you to find merely
that the defendant was suffering from a diseased
or defective mental condition when he committed
clusions of mental disease and the causal
connection between the disease and the
act.' 45 Before this quoted language, there
appears recognition of the fact that a court
cannot state the whole of its instructions
in one sentence.
The appellate court emphasized that:
"When the issue of insanity is properly
raised by evidence, as it was in this case,
the burden is on the Government to prove
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.' 46
Since the Davis147 case in 1895, this has
been the law in the federal courts. Under
the Durham doctrine as expressed in Carter:
"To claim exemption from responsibility
for a criminal act an accused must assert
two conditions: (1) that he suffered from
a mental disease or defect and (2) that
his alleged criminal act was the product or
result of that disease or defect."' 48
When this defense is raised the Govern-
ment may assert one or the other or both
of two propositions: (a) that the accused
had no 'mental defect or disease or (2)
that even if he did the criminal act was
not the product thereof. The burden is upon
the Government to establish beyond a rea-
sonable doubt whatever position it takes
upon the issue.
. The appellate court further found the
term product or causal connection had not
been adequately set forth. The Durham
case, it said, ". . . merely extended the
established rule to apply the defense to
all acts which would not have been com-
the offense. You must find that the act was the
result, the product of the mental abnormality."
Carter v. United States, supra note 142, at 614.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
147 Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
148 Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 615
(D.C.Cir. 1957).
mitted except for a mental illness of the
accused.'14
9
In describing what it meant by the re-
lationship between the criminal act and the
mental disease, the court said it must be
critical: "By 'critical' we mean decisive,
determinative, causal; we mean to convey
the idea inherent in the phrases 'because of,'
'except for,' 'without which,' 'but for,' 'effect
of,' 'result of,' 'causative factor'; the disease
made the effective or decisive difference be-
tween doing and not doing the act."' 50
A revealing court footnote informs us
that this is the. manner of stating the
defense. The burden of proof once it is
raised is on the Government. So the issue
to be put to the jury is whether the Gov-
ernment has met this defense beyond a
reasonable doubt.15 '
Psychiatrists shake their heads when
asked to give an opinion beyond a reason-
able doubt as to the absence of a direct,
critical, causal, controlling, decisive rela-
tionship between the criminal act and the
disease or defect, some evidence of which
has been introduced. That issue is for the
jury. The Government simply discusses
the disease and "its dynamics." Even those
psychiatrists who feel able to testify on
this point after making an examination
are likely to change their minds when they
receive a subpoena.
The prosecutor's job, once "some evi-
dence" has been introduced, is like that of
the lady trying to remove a spot of tar from
the fine delicate fabric of an evening dress.
Many a self-reliant lady confronted with a
spot of tar on the evening gown she must
wear that night does not even attempt to
149 Id. at 616.
150 id. at 617.
151Id. at 617 n. 16.
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remove it. She changes the gown. Only the
judges can change the Rule.
Wright v. United States15 2 was decided
a week after the Carter case. In Carter, so
far as the instructions are concerned, it was
possible to agree that the trial court had
rephrased the standard Durham instruc-
tions. It is even possible to agree that as
rephrased by the trial court they might have
been a shade less onerous in so far as the
Government is concerned. But in Wright,
the trial court had instructed as to a fourth
possible verdict - not guilty by reason of
insanity. The appellate court said: "The
charge included a recital, virtually in haec
verba, of the sample instruction suggested
in Durham v. United States, . . . and a state-
ment of the Davis rule that the prosecution
must prove sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt."15
The appellate court was critical of the
"contrasting treatment" of two of the pos-
sible verdicts, namely, not guilty by reason
of insanity and not guilty. It felt that there
was a possibility that the jury might infer
that in order to acquit by reason of insanity
it would be necessary for them to reach
the affirmative conclusions that Wright was
insane at the time of the crime and that the
act was the product of the illness. The court
also commented that the sample Durham
instructions were not meant to be an in-
flexible directive to be followed by rote.
"Where, as here, the need for more appears,
it is the duty of the judge to fill in the
sketch, as may be appropriate on the basis
of the evidence, to provide the jury with
light and guidance in the performance of
its difficult task.' '1 54
152 250 F.2d 4 (D.C.Cir. 1957).
153Id. at 10-11.
154 Id. at 11.
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The court also criticized the refusal of
the trial court to give a M'Naghten instruc-
tion for which there was an evidentiary
basis. Instructions in line with Douglas'"
and Stewart'5 6 should also have been given.
It was also felt that "causal connection"
should have been defined. The court ob-
served that in Carter"' there is an elabora-
tion of the meaning of this term.
Judges Wilbur Miller, Danaher, and
Bastian dissented in the Wright case. Judge
Miller wrote:
For the reasons stated I cannot concur
in the majority's disposition of the case,
which seems to me to be a usurpation of
the jury's function, and another example
of what I regard as an alarming judicial
tendency to magnify the rights of criminals
at the expense of the public interest in the
strict enforcement of the criminal laws,
particularly in cases where the defense of
insanity is interposed. This reversal allows
a murderer to go unpunished and, in all
probability, will result in his almost imme-
diate release from any custodial restraint.'58
After referring to the passage from the
majority opinion in which the "contrasting
treatment" of two possible verdicts was set
forth as constituting a danger from which
the. jury might conclude that in order to
acquit Wright by reason of insanity it
would be necessary for them to reach an
affirmative conclusion of sanity, the dissent
continues:
This means that the majority think there
is danger that the jury might infer from the
charge that Wright had the burden of prov-
155 Douglas v. United States, 239 F.2d 52 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
156 Stewart v. United States, 247 F.2d 42 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
157 The date of Carter is October 24, 1957. The
date of the Wright opinion is one week later,
October 30, 1957; the date of the second trial was
December 14-22, 1955.
158 Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4, 16 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
ing he was insane at the time of the crime
when in fact the Government had the bur-
den of proving sanity after some evidence
of insanity had been brought forward. The
danger is fanciful; the majority's apprehen-
sion probably springs from their failure
carefully to examine the complete charge.
Judge McLaughlin made it quite clear that
in the circumstances the burden was on the
Government to prove sanity beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. 159
The dissent then discusses the impact of
the Durham rule, and its lack of acceptance
159 Id. at 17. The dissent continues: "For example,
he said to the jury: 'You are instructed that if
you, the jury, believe beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant Clarence L. Wright committed
the criminal act with which he is charged, and.
was not suffering from a mental disease or from a
mental defect at the time he committed the said
criminal act, you may find him guilty.' and again
he said, using almost verbatim the language of
the Durham case:
'You are further instructed that unless you be-
lieve beyond a reasonable doubt either that the
defendant was not suffering from a disease or
mental condition, or that the act was not the
product of any mental disease or mental defect,
you must find the accused not guilty because of
insanity;' to which he later added this:
'Now, to summarize: If you find that the Gov-
ernment has established beyond a reasonable doubt
all of the essential elements of the crime as I have
delineated them to you, and if you also find be-
yond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not
suffering from a mental disease or a defective
mental condition at the time the criminal act was
committed, then you may find the defendant
guilty.' Finally Judge McLaughlin said this to the
jury:
'Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, every per-
son is presumed to be sane until the contrary
appears. This presumption is founded on human
experience. This presumption does not mean,
however, that the burden of proof is on the de-
fendant to prove insanity. If the defendant offers
any evidence that the defendant was legally insane
at the time of the deed, the presumption of sanity
vanishes from the case. The burden is then on
the prosecution, the Government, to establish the
sanity of the defendant.
'In other words, on the issue of insanity, or of
mental incapacity, as it is otherwise called, just
in other jurisdictions,t 6 0 and concludes that
it is to be preferred to the looser rule
announced by the court in Wright.
Upon analysis one is constrained to
anticipate an even more formidable diffi-
culty: assuming the defense has announced
the defense of insanity but that the "some
evidence" offered has been inconclusive and
the Government has not produced evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt as to defend-
ant's sanity, is it logical to assume or
conclude that in the state of the record
the jury will return a finding of not guilty
by reason of insanity? It seems more logical
to me that the jury upon careful considera-
tion of the instructions would feel impelled
to return a straight "not guilty" verdict.
That this has not, to my knowledge, hap-
pened is a tribute to the common sense of
the jury. But, as our juries gain knowledge
as on every other issue in the case, the burden of
proof is on the prosecution, and that burden must
be sustained beyond a reasonable doubt.' In view
of the carefully worded and repeated admonitions
to the jury, it seems to me there is no basis what-
ever for the majority's apprehension that the jury
might infer from the instructions that the burden
of proof was on the defendant." Ibid. (Emphasis
added.)
160 "The Durham case has been pressed upon and
rejected by the United States Court of Military
Appeals, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, and the
highest courts of Maryland, Montana, California,
Indiana, Vermont and Washington. United States
v. Kunak, 5 USCMA 346 (1954); Howard v.
United States, 5 Cir., 1956, 232 F.2d 274; Ander-
sen v. United States, 9 Cir., 1956, 237 F.2d 118;
Thomas v. State, 1955, 206 Md. 575, 112 A.2d
913; State v. Kitchens, 1955, 129 Mont. 331, 286
P.2d 1079; People v. Ryan, 1956, 140 Cal.App.
2d 412, 295 P.2d 496; Flowers v. State, Ind. 1956,
139 N.E.2d 185; State v. Goyet, Vt. 1957, 132
A.2d 623; State v. Collins, Wash. 1957, 314 P.2d
660. Cf. State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 270 P.2d
727, decided by the Supreme Court of New Mex-
ico May 12, 1954, a few weeks before the Durham
decision. As far as I know the Durham rule pre-
vails nowhere else except in New Hampshire, its
birthplace." Id. at 18 n. 3.
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of the implications of confinement in an
insane asylum, 161 they may become reluc-
tant to find this verdict in the case of one
wherein there is doubt concerning insanity
and where the condition shows little hope
of improvement.162
The question I raise is simply: Should
a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
be predicated on doubt? When juries learn
this they may well resolve the issue by a
verdict of "not guilty." Heretofore the di-
lemma has been resolved in some cases by
finding the defendant "guilty" when the
evidence of criminality is strong and uncon-
tradicted and the evidence of insanity is
weak, inconclusive, and contradictory.
The dissent concludes by indicating that
the majority opinion further'complicates a
complex and difficult problem and predicts
that the trial judges who have heretofore
found the rule difficult to understand and
apply will now find it even more difficult.
In Catlin v. United States,16 3 the same judge
also dissented, saying in substance that if
one knew what he was doing was wrong,
but freely and voluntarily chose to do it
and was not impelled by an irresistible
impulse, he should be held criminally re-
sponsible for his act even though he thought
the moon was made of green cheese. He
concluded by calling for the overruling of
the Durham rule.
In a separate concurring opinion, Judge
Burger gave an explanation of the objec-
tive of the Carter opinion, and emphasized
that mental disease to exculpate must be
161 See Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d 667 (D.C.
Cir. 1958); de Grazia, The Distinction of Being
Mad, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 339, 350 (1955).
162 See Overholser v. Leach, supra note 161. In
such a case, as counsel argued, the verdict may
be to a sentence of life imprisonment.
163 251 F.2d 368 (D.C.Cir. 1957).
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shown'0 4 to have a positive causal relation-
ship to the criminal act and that it must
be shown to be controlling, decisive, and
compelling. He concluded by observing:
These are complicated, difficult and
trying problems for the law enforcement
officers, for the profession and for the
courts, and solutions are often elusive. As
with all difficult legal problems the pro-
nouncements of Carter v. United States
require concentrated, thoughtful study, and
where that is given improved understand-
ing and better administration of justice will
follow.'65
Psychopathy
This special problem is one of the most
challenging and difficult that has been en-
countered. The psychopath is easier to rec-
ognize than to define.60
The American Law Institute meets the
issue head on: "The terms 'mental disease
or defect' do not include an abnormality
164 If this were the opinion of the Appellate
Court it would appear that the defense would have
the burden of proof on the issue of insanity as
a defense. This is the rule in twenty-one states
and under a broad formulation like Durham
would be most appropriate. This doctrine leaves
the defendant in control of this issue which can
be raised by the slight quantum of "some evi-
dence." The prosecution has the obligation of
proof of sanity or lack of causality beyond a rea-
sonable doubt and may not even know of the
defense until the trial.
165Catlin v. United States, 251 F.2d 368, 373
(D.C.Cir. 1957).
166 "The psychopath is distinguished both from
the subject of mental disease (the psychotic) and
from the neurotic by exhibiting no definite point
in time at which his abnormality began, but by
remaining always fundamentally the same sort
of person, although subsidiary changes may occur
in the course of time. It has been suggested that
the differences may be put in the form of a simple
analogy: in the psychotic we suppose that there
has been some radical breakdown in the machin-
ery; in the neurotic we suppose that it is work-
ing badly, though perhaps only temporarily so;
in the psychopath we suppose that the machinery
manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise anti-social conduct.' 167
Dr. Manfred Guttmacher, one of the
psychiatric consultants of the American
Law Institute's study on Criminal Respon-
sibility, wrote Professor Wechsler of the
Institute:
Psychopathy. Very few in this group
should be exculpated, and only where it
can be shown or deduced that the indi-
vidual has made real efforts to control his
criminal impulses and has found it im-
possible to do so. Whether there be rec-
ommended for the severely psychopathic
individuals, special types of verdicts, inde-
terminate sentences and special types of
institutions are matters that should be fully
considered.1 68
The purpose of the Institute draft section
4.01(2) was to require that there be other
evidence of mental abnormality than the
mere fact of repetitive offending before
the offender could claim immunity from
responsibility 169
In cases which have reached the circuit
court, this waste basket 70 category has pro-
duced only a few in which it has even been
was built to an unusual pattern or is faulty. We
believe that this analysis of the essential differ-
ence between psychopathic personality and mental
disease represents the highest common measure of
agreement among members of the medical profes-
sion at the present time, though we recognise
that it would not be universally acceptable; many
of the adherents of the psychoanalytic school
would not recognise the fundamental distinction
and would regard psychopathic personality as a
form of mental disease." Royal Commission on
Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, REPORT Cmd.
No. 8932, at 136 (1953). See also Id. at 139.
167 ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE Appendix C,
§4.01(2), (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
168 Id. Appendix C, §4.01, at 186.
160 ALl REPORTER 212 (1955).
170 REPORT, N. J. COMM'N ON HABITUAL SEX
OFFENDER 39 (1950).
mentioned' 7 ' and only one in which it has
been a justiciable issue172
John D. Leach was charged in three
indictments with certain offenses related to
armed robbery. His defense in part was that
he was a sociopath.713 The jury found him
not guilty by reason of insanity. He was
committed to a mental hospital. A few
months thereafter he filed pro se a habeas
corpus petition alleging that he was of
sound mind and could no longer be held.
Seven psychiatrists testified. Two called
by the petitioner gave testimony that he was
of sound mind and that he had never suf-
fered from mental disease. All seven agreed
that he was a "sociopathic personality
with dyssocial outlook" and that he would
be dangerous to the community if now
released.
The district court appeared to be more
impressed by the testimony of the two psy-
chiatrists called by the petitioner and or-
dered him released.
On the respondent's motion for summary
reversal, the circuit court reversed the order
of discharge. The opinion distinguished
between those committed to a mental hos-
pital following a finding of not guilty by
reason of insanity, 174 and those who are
the subject of a civil commitment. In
explaining the significance of the statute
which applies to those found not guilty by
reason of insanity, the court said in the
Leach case:
The test of this statute is not whether a
11 Perry v. United States, 256 F.2d 892 (D.C.
Cir. 1958); Buscoe v. United States, 248 F.2d
640 (D.C.Cir. 1957); Taylor v. United States, 222
F.2d 398 (D.C.Cir. 1955).
172 Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d 667 (D.C.Cir.
1958).
178 Sociopath is a more recent term equivalent to
psychopath.
174 D. C. CODE ANN. §24-301 (Supp. VI, 1958).
5 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1959
particular individual, engaged in the ordi-
nary pursuits of life, is committable to a
mental institution under the law governing
civil commitments. Cf. Overholser v. Wil-
liams, 1958, 102 U.S. App. D.C. 248, 252
F. 2d 629. Those laws do not apply here.
This statute applies to an exceptional class
of people - people who have committed
acts forbidden by law, who have obtained
verdicts of "not guilty by reason of in-
sanity," and who have been committed to a
mental institution pursuant to the Code. [1751
People in that category are treated by Con-
gress in a different fashion from persons
who have somewhat similar mental condi-
tions, but who have not committed offenses
or obtained verdicts of not guilty by reason
of insanity at criminal trials. The phrase
"establishing his eligibility for release," as
applied to the special class of which Leach
is a member, means something different
from having one or more psychiatrists say
simply that the individual is "sane." There
must be freedom from such abnormal men-
tal condition as would make the individual
dangerous to himself or the community in
the reasonably forseeable future. 176
This case may well have a salutary effect
on those who enter the defense of insanity
as a device for avoiding criminal respon-
sibility. Psychiatrists generally agreed that
the chances of any significant change in his
condition were slight. Leach's future con-
duct at the hospital will be watched with
great interest by all.
If, Leach had been able to procure his
release from the hospital within a few
months after his participation in the crimi-
nal act and his trial therefor, it would have
cast grave doubt upon the efficacy of the
Durham doctrine. The circuit court in re-
quiring such a person as Leach to show that
175 Here the court refers to Williams v. United
States, 250 F.2d 19, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
176 Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
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he is no longer suffering from mental ab-
normality and that he is not likely to be
dangerous in the reasonably foreseeable
future to himself or others has in effect
plugged the hole in the dike. The dike,
however, must be constantly watched for
other leaks which may inundate the com-
munity and reduce the doctrine to a mock-
ery. One of the cases we are watching
closely is that of United States v. Hough,
infra.
Conclusion
It is probably still too early to venture
an evaluation of the Durham rule. Last fall
Durham, as we understand it, was the sub-
ject of modifications and definite exten-
sions. I refer to the Carter, 7' Wright,178
Lyles,1 79 Fielding,80 and Williams181 cases.
As thus extended and modified it has
resulted in an increased number of acquit-
tals by reason of insanity. 182 This increase
furnishes no basis for alarm. However,
what is just over the horizon in the nature
of future changes only time will reveal.
Reversals and retrials are time consum-
ing and costly. The deterrency value of the
criminal law is impaired and sometimes
lost completely by delay in the ultimate
'77 Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
178 Wright v. United States, 215 F.2d 498 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).
179 Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
180 Fielding v. United States, 251 F.2d 878 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
181 Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
182 There were seventeen acquittals by reason of
insanity in the fiscal year 1958. This is 141%
of the average number of such acquittals in the
years following Durham. Reversals which resulted
in such determinations are included.
disposition of cases. The new rule is vague
and lacking in criteria understandable by
an average jury, and difficult to apply. If
the ultimate objective is a non-punitive
system with mental hospitals and psychia-
trists substituted for prisons and penolo-
gists, it is properly a problem for Congress,
both legally and in a budgetary sense.
As of the present time, the burden im-
posed on the prosecution is exacting and
often practically impossible to bear.183 In
cases comparable to the Hough184 case
it will proceed on an ad hoc basis. Con-
vincing a jury that there is a basis for
their determination of responsibility is less
difficult than sustaining such a conclu-
sion before the appellate court, as we
183 See Hough v. United States, Criminal No.
566-57 (D.D.C. 1957). Defendent had shot
and killed her former fianc6 who had come to her
apartment to express condolences on the death of
her father. Psychiatrists agreed she was suffering
from paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the
act. One psychiatrist said this condition had been
known to him for about 12 years and that he had
recommended her hospitalization years ago. Be-
cause of the unanimity of medical opinion as to
the severity of the disease and its relation to the
killing we concurred in the motion for a finding
of not guilty by reason of insanity. Three months
after the insanity verdict and about 18 months
after the fatal shooting which occurred as the
victim was looking out of a window with his
back turned to the defendant, her conditional re-
lease was recommended by the Superintendent of
the hospital. All psychiatrists including the Super-
intendent, who testified at the conditional release
hearing, agreed that the defendant is still suffer-
ing from paranoid schizophrenia, a major mental
illness. The Superintendent expressed the opinion
that the proposed release posed little danger to
the community. Other equally distinguished psy-
chiatrists disagreed. The district court denied the
application. Much of the progress achieved in
establishing community acceptance of the Durham
doctrine would be lost through the premature
release of still potentially dangerous persons.
184 Ibid,
have learned in Carter,185 Wright,186 and
Fielding. 87
The question still remains: Are we ap-
proaching a point wherein the psychiatrist
will further dominate this area? There are
definite indications that juries no longer
are free to reject the inconclusive conclu-
sions of the psychiatrist. 188 Will this trend
lead ultimately to acceptance of the phil-
osophy of determinism 8 9 and the abandon-
ment of the principles of free will?' 90
There are those who feel that we are
headed toward a totally nonpunitive sys-
tem of rehabilitation in mental institutions.
That such a system would impair the con-
cept of deterrency is clear.
It seems to me that the objectives of
modernizing the M'Naghten rules as modi-
fied by the Smith'' decision are clearly
justified. The extent of the more recent
changes and whether it is the most desir-
able method of achieving true progress is
debatable.
A more convincing basis for the inter-
position of the defense of insanity would
be established if a statute were enacted or
a rule of court were promulgated which
required the defense to give timely notice
of this defense. Fourteen states have by
statute required such notice. The ALI
Model Criminal Code requires notice (see
185 Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C.
Cir. 1956).
18 Wright v. United States, 215 F.2d 498 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).
187 Fielding v. United States, 251 F.2d 878 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
188 See Wright v. United States, supra note 186;
Fielding v. United States, supra note 187.
189 See Kaplan, Barriers to the Establishment of
a Deterministic Criminal Law, 46 Ky. L. J. 103,
111 (1957).
190 Durham does not go this far.
191 Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir.
1929).
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§4.03). Notice and the opportunity for a
psychiatric examination by a Government-
selected psychiatrist would minimize the
opportunity for a defendant to feign in-
sanity as a defense.
If we are to expect the jurymen to pass
intelligently on the issue of responsibility,
then they should be given understandable
criteria for their guidance. Causality is the
mainspring of Durham. But when the Gov-
ernment is obligated to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that either the accused is
not suffering from a mental disease or defect,
or if he is, that beyond a reasonable doubt
the criminal act is not the critical decisive
result of the disease, the Government is
given what in many instances may be an im-
possible burden.
This very important question under the
Durham doctrine would be avoided if the
defense were required to assume the burden
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence
insofar as the defense of insanity is con-
cerned. Twenty-one states now follow this
rule. Assuming the burden of proof under
the M'Naghten rule as required by the Davis
case, supra, is a far less onerous task inso-
far as the Government is concerned than
to prove the negative of productivity.
An anomalous result may follow. An
accused who introduces "some evidence" of
mental disease or defect forces the Gov-
ernment to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the absence of a critical causal con-
nection between the act and the disease. If
the Government fails to bear this burden,
the vague quantum of proof of "some
evidence" of mental disease may result in
confinement in a mental institution. Is this
due process?
How long such "patients" will remain in
our already overcrowded and understaffed
mental hospitals no one knows. The law
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now requires that such confinement last
until the superintendent certifies and the
court finds the individual has recovered his
sanity and is no longer dangerous to himself
or others. Such a determination involves
great difficulty and admitted uncertainty.
1 2
Deterrency as a protection to the public
would be materially diminished.
My own feeling is that Durham and sub-
sequent cases extending the causality con-
cept in an effort to modernize our criminal
law concepts have overshot the mark.
A significant development has taken
place recently in the District of Columbia.
The Committee on Legal Aspects of Psy-
chiatry of the Washington Psychiatric So-
ciety met jointly with the Bar Association
Committee on Criminal Responsibility. The
Chairman of the Committee on Psychiatry,
Dr. Richard Board, in expressing the opin-
ion of his committee, stated that if the
Durham decision were applied strictly it
would probably require a finding of not
guilty by reason of insanity in approxi-
mately 90 per cent of all criminal cases.
Dr. Board pointed out that mental hospi-
tals are not available to discharge this com-
mitment responsibility, and even if they
were, he feels that a prison commitment
would be more likely to produce desirable
results in most of the cases. Dr. Board
pointed out that under the Durham deci-
sion most sociopaths would certainly be
found not guilty by reason of insanity,
but that from the standpoint of the com-
munity, prison confinement would be more
likely to be productive of affirmative results
in the direction of rehabilitation.
Under the Durham rule, psychiatrists
recognize the difficulty with which the
Government is confronted in obtaining ex-
102 de Grazia, The Distinction of Being Mad, 22
U. Cm. L. REv. 339, 350 n. 41 (1955).
pert testimony on the negative of causa-
tion. This is particularly true when such
opinion must be expressed and proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Seven out of
eight members of the Committee on the
Legal Aspects of Psychiatry of the Wash-
ington Psychiatric Society felt that the
American Law Institute rule on criminal
responsibility as modified by them is pref-
erable to the Durham rule.
The American Law Institute formulation
broadens the opportunity for the psychia-
trist to present his facts, observations, and
conclusions, unfettered by M'Naghten, but
retains control in the court and jury of the
issue of responsibility. The Institute for-
mulation is expressed in general behavioral
terms: "A person is not responsible for
criminal conduct if at the time of such con-
duct as a result of mental disease or defect
he lacks substantial capacity either to ap-
preciate the criminality of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law.'
'1 9 3
I am told that the word "wrongfulness"
was substituted for the word "criminality"
in the proposed New York Code by the
Commission appointed by Governor Har-
riman.1 94 It seems to me wrongfulness
should be in the A.L.I. formula either in
addition to criminality or in substitution
thereof.
During the past month, I learned from
Professor Livingston Hall, the Vice Dean
of the Harvard University Law School, that
the Special Commission on Capital Punish-
ment and Insanity of Massachusetts has
recommended, according to a newspaper
account, that an acquittal would be justified
193 ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE §4.01(1) (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955).
194 INTERIM REPORT, GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE
ON THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY (April 1958).
"if the jury is convinced that the accused
did not know the nature or quality of his
act, did not know it was wrong, or was
incapable of preventing himself from
doing it." This formula is taken from para.
317 of the Royal Commission Report. It,
too, is a modernization of M'Naghten and
follows the proposals of the British Medical
Association. Maryland is also considering
a change in the M'Naghten doctrine. Under
the chairmanship of Dr. Manfred S. Gutt-
macher, the American Law Institute rule
has been recommended.
From the time of recorded history, and
certainly throughout the Old Testament
and the New, the teaching is upon right-
eousness and avoidance of those concepts
considered wrong by our collective con-
science. Of such basic considerations are
our laws conceived and enacted. Juries
understand right and wrong. Capacity is
another fundamental concept: Does he
have the capacity to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law or does he
lack capacity. The American Law Institute
formulation as proposed for New York
modernizes M'Naghten, retaining its under-
standable criteria for the guidance of the
jury. It broadens M'Naghten to include
the volitive as well as the cognative.
Psychiatrists are given the opportunity of
expressing their findings and conclusions
freely and within the scope of their training
but are not called upon to act as the
arbiters of the criminal court controversy
on the issue of responsibility.
The proposed Massachusetts formula-
tion is comparable in concept to the A.L.I.
rule. The development in Maryland is also
encouraging, though as previously indicated
I prefer the word "wrongfulness" to the
word "criminality." Confusion may result
from the use of the word "criminality,"
5 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1959
in that it is more legalistic and less inclu-
sive than "wrongfulness."
There is convincing evidence that strong
efforts are being made to improve the
administration of justice by bringing this
problem out into the open. Two outstand-
ing studies, the Royal Commission Report
which is world-wide in scope and the Amer-
ican Law Institute study, have reached the
conclusion that affirmative steps should be
taken to modernize the rules which govern
those cases in which insanity is interposed
as a defense. The United States Court of,
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
has boldly and courageously struggled with
this- age-old problem in the Durham cases
and some forty others in the last four years.
The judicial case-by-case method to
which our Court of Appeals is limited is
not always the most effective means of
writing new law. Hearings at which diver-
gent views can be expressed and at which
those who entertain such views can be
questioned are desirable and in many in-
stances necessary in order to furnish the
fairest and most just basis for the evolu-
tion of a new rule in so controversial a field
as this. It is obvious that important budg-
etary problems are related to whatever rule
is evolved. Only Congress can appropriate
and authorize the expenditure of funds.
Probably no single decision has inspired
so much thought, discussion, approval, and
condemnation as the rule in the Durham
case.
Based on the Government's experience
in these many cases, I feel that this most
important problem should be the subject
of a legislative inquiry to determine the
nature and character of rules for the guid-
ance of trial courts and counsel in those
cases wherein the issue is the responsibility
of the accused.
